The act of denying support to a child penalized under RA 9262 is a continuing crime.

May foreigners be held liable for violation of RA 9262? This is the question raised in  this case decided by the Supreme Court.  This case tackled the issue of whether or not aliens who sired a child with a Filipino spouse may be held liable for support. 

The Facts:

ßAAA and BBB were married in Holland in 1190.  They had a son, CCC, born in 1994.  Their marriage, however, did not last, and in 1995, they entered into a Divorce Covenant.  AAA, the wife, and her son went back to the Philippines.  BBB later went to the Philippines, contracted another marriage, and established a catering business in the Province of Cebu.  Both AAA and BBB were residents of Cebu. Alleging that BBB did not provide financial support for their son, AAA sent a demand letter for support to BBB.  BBB refused to receive the letter, hence AAA filed a complaint for violation of RA 9262 against BBB.  Preliminary investigation ensued, and the provincial prosecutor later on filed a case for violation of Section 5 (E)(2) against BBB. BBB posted bail, and was arraigned.  Before the RTC, he filed his motion to dismiss the case, averring that since he is an alien, he is not bound to support the child under RA 9262.  

The RTC sided with BBB, and dismissed the case. 

On pure question of law, AAA appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether or not BBB, a foreign national, is liable for violation of RA 9262.

Ruling:

On whether or not BBB is bound by Art. 195 of the Family Code on the obligation of parents to support the child, the Supreme Court held that BBB is not liable since the Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality.

“Insofar as family laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same applies only to Filipino citizens.  By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.  Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, to to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.”

While the Court said that respondent is not obliged to give support to his child under Art. 195 of the Family Code, it also said that respondent is not altogether bound to give support to his child.  While he pleaded Dutch law in his defense, he was not able to prove his national law, which must be proven as fact in this jurisdiction as they do not prove themselves in the Philippines and the courts are not allowed to take judicial notice of them.  Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.  For failure on the part of the respondent to allege and prove the national law of Netherlands on support, the Court applied the doctrine of processual presumption in resolving that respondent is liable to support his child, thus:

“In view of the respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.  Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that foreign law is the same as our local law or domestic or internal law.  Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalising the non-compliance therewith”

Another thing that militated against the accused is the doctrine, applied in the ruling of Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, that when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied:

“Additionally prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle embedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure is pertinent.

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.  Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.  To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principle of Conflict of laws.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support the child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice the the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

In the end, the Court applied the territoriality principle in criminal law, in finding the respondent may be held liable for violation of RA 9262 for failure to support his minor child:

“In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: [p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations.”  On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City.  As such our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent.  It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.”

No prescription of the offense charged:

“Finally, we do not agree with the respondent’s argument that granting, without admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of RA 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crimes under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period - Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5 (f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.  Acts falling under Section 5 (g) to 5 (i) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Secton  5(e) (2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.  Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.”

Case was remanded to the RTC for trial on the merits.

(G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM vs. ENRST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM)

Even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R. A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts

May a Philippine court acquire jurisdiction in a case for psychological violence under Article 9262 when the act causing mental or emotional anguish was committed abroad?  In this case, the act causing the mental and emotional anguish which is an element of the crime in a prosecution for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act 9262, was the alleged extra-marital affair conducted by the husband working abroad with a Singaporean woman.  

This is the question of law raised in a Rule 45 petition by AAA. 

AAA filed a case for violation of RA 9262 against BBB.  Among the allegations in her complaint before the Prosecutor’s Office was that BBB, whom she married in 2006, had an illicit affair in Singapore when the latter went there to work as a chef sometime in 2007.  Eventually, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed a case for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 against BBB, for causing emotional and mental anguish on AAA by having an illicit relationship with a woman in Singapore.  Subsequently, an information was filed against BBB.

In 2013, BBB filed an Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest before the RTC.  He argued that he cannot be charged with the crime as the alleged marital infidelity was committed in Singapore, thus the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

The RTC sided with BBB and quashed the Information.  The court reasoned out that it had no jurisdiction over the offense as the act itself which had caused mental and emotional anguish must have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.  As the act which allegedly caused the mental and emotional anguish was committed in Singapore, the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

AAA disagrees, and argue that the strict interpretation of the law by the RTC poses a danger that the law may become a useless piece of legislation because with its ruling, Filipino husbands may commit illicit relationship without fear of any consequence as long as they were committed abroad.  She argues further that the court may exercise jurisdiction over the offense charged as long any of the essential elements of the crime are present.  In this case, she posits that the mental and emotional anguish she experience is an essential element of the crime which she experience s wherever she goes, citing Section 7 of the law itself which provides for the jurisdiction of the RTC, in relation to Art. 4 of the law, mandating the liberal interpretation of the law in promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.

The Court’s ruling:

RA 9262 criminalizes the mental and emotional anguish caused by marital infidelity, not the marital infidelity itself:

“Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalises is not the marital infidelity per se, but the psychological violence causing mental and emotional suffering on the wife.  Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.  Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed.  Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not be even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife.  Thus the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.”

Section 7 of RA 9262 contemplates that venue pertains to jurisdiction:

"In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction,  As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed there the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.  Which the psychological as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an essential element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.  The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estate, viz:

x x x x

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another.  In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognisance of the same excludes the other.  Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph © was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense.   In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act of causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB’s marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction.  It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband.  What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is committed abroad.  We say that even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R. A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.”

(AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018)

RA 9262: The law should be construed in accordance with legislative intent to impose severe sanction on offenders who commit acts of violence against women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship.

Just because your relationship with a woman had ended does not mean you cannot be anymore be charged with violation of Republic Act 9262.  While Section 3 of RA 9262 defines violence against women and children and delineates who may be held liable, the same applies also to offenders who commit acts of violence against women and children even if the the sexual or dating relationship had ended

This is the case of AAA, respondent-woman, and BBB, petitioner-man.  Their relationship ended  prior to the subject incident.  Sometime in July, 2009, AA met BBB and sought payment of the money the latter owed her.  BBB could not pay.  When he asked her if she was the one responsible for spreading rumours about him, she admitted it.  BBB slapped her, thus AA filed a case against BBB for violation of Section 5 (a).  The case eventually reached the RTC, where BBB filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.  Since the RTC denied his plea, BBB went up to the Supreme Court on our question of law, on whether or not BBB should be held liable for violation of RA 9262, since the physical injuries inflicted was committed after the relationship between the parties have ended.  



Ruling against the petitioner, the Court held:



There are two limiting qualifications for an act or a series of acts to be considered as violence against women and children:



“The law is broad in specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women and children through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child, or against her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.



It is not indispensable that the act of violence be committed be a consequence of such relationship.



“Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.  Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred.  Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts  of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual relationship.  As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and th victim when the physical harm was committed.  Consequently, the Court cannot act depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner’s assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.”



The law should be construed in accordance with legislative intent to impose severe sanction on offenders who commit acts of violence against women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship.



“Neither can the Court construe the statue in favor of the petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction.  While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former.  Clearly the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.”
(G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013, BBB vs. RTC Branch 59, Angeles City; the Office of the City Prosecutor, and ABC)

About Philippine Law Updates blog

Hello all.  I am Atty. Robert Divinagracia, the publisher of this blog.  I'm starting this blog primarily to cope up with the effects of the lockdown due to this COVID-19 pandemic.  One can only do so much while being confined to the four quarters of you home, now running at three weeks.  TV and movie reruns, reading old books, exercise, eating, these are the choices you have when cooped up.  Of course, this also family.  So I decided to while away my time by reading updates on jurisprudence.  After all, learning does not stop, and what better way to do it when you have all the time in the world.

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