A Rule 108 petition is not proper when a party's filiation will be gravely affected...

The Facts:

Glenn is one of the legitimate children of John (deceased) and Beatriz.  Joan, on the other hand, claims to be an illegitimate daughter of John, and after John’s death, filed a petition for partition and accounting of John’s estate.  Glenn, on the other hand, filed a petition for cancellation of Joan’s certificate of live birth under Rule 108, praying also that Joan’s surname be changed from Miller to Espineda in all her official documents.  Glenn alleged that as his father John did not affix his signature on Joan’s birth certificate, he did not acknowledge Joan as his illegitimate child.  In her defense, Joan insisted that John continously and openly recognized her as his daughter, by supporting her education, and mentioned her in his letter to Lonie.  He also gave Joan 1/8 of his estate in his holographic will.

After trial, the RTC dismissed Glenn’s petition, which the CA affirmed, thus Glenn filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

The Issue:

Whether or not a Rule 108 petition is proper to compel Joan to change her surname from Miller to Espenida.

The Ruling:

This Court stresses that Glenn's initiatory pleading before the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City is a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida.

This type of petition is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

RULE 108

Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SECTION 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; G) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SECTION 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SECTION 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SECTION 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SECTION 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SECTION 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

In In re: Barretto v. The Local Registrar of Manila, this Court explained that:

. . . the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to "innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" or corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.^[60]

Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her birth certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use her mother's surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an acknowledged illegitimate child of John.

What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.

Petition dismissed.

G.R. 200344, August 28, 2019, GLENN M. MILLER, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING LEGAL HEIRS, NAMELY: [1] EVELYN L. MILLER; [2] JENNIFER ANN L. MILLER; [3] LESLIE ANN L. MILLER; [4] RACHEL ANN L. MILLER; AND [5] VALERIE ANN L. MILLER, PETITIONERS, VS. JOAN MILLER Y ESPENIDA A.K.A. JOHNLYN MILLER Y ESPENIDA AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GUBAT, SORSOGON,RESPONDENTS.

RA 9262: Denying the use of the appliances and furniture commonly owned by the family can be a ground for mental and emotional distress.

Even the simple act of of a husband’s moving out of the household the appliances and furniture that are part of the conjugal house, and transferring it to his parent’s house, when the same is against the will of the wife and causes her distress, can lead to a conviction for RA 9262.

This is one case where the Supreme Court went beyond the allegations of the Information in the case and proceeded to determine the guilt of the accused based on the testimony of the victim that she was a victim of psychological violence by her husband by appreciating previous incidents of abuse that in totality caused the victim mental and emotional anguish. Personally, I believe that this case should be a lesson for lawyers to be mindful of the testimony of adverse witness at the witness stand, so as to exclude irrelevant and immaterial matters from being included in the direct testimony by way of timely objection to the questions propounded or the answers given thereto, otherwise, those other matters not alleged in the Information should not have found its way into the records of the case.   Of course, the SC made much of the fact that the relevant portion of the information was indeed proven beyond reasonable doubt, but it cannot be denied that the Court also appreciated other acts of the accused not included in the Information but forming part of the victim’s testimony to establish mental and emotional anguish on the part of the victim, leading to the accused’s conviction.

The Information in the case reads:

That on or about February 17, 2010 in the City of [XXX], Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of violence against his wife [BBB], as follows: by taking their conjugal properties and bring[ing] them to the house of his mother without regard to her feelings and against her will which caused mental, emotional anguish to his legal wife [BBB].

Contrary to and in violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against women and their Children Act of 2004.

The Facts:

AAA, husband and BBB, had been married for 19 years when on February 17, 2010, they had an altercation.  AAA learned that AAA had incurred debts and some of the appliances which he bought with his hard-earned money were used as collateral by AAA.  As a result, AAA took out some of the appliances and brought it to his parents’ house nearby, depriving AAA of the use and enjoyment of the appliances.  The incident was witnessed by their child, CCC.  As a result of the incident, BBB filed a case for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262.  After trial, the court convicted AAA as charged, hence BBB appealed his case all the way to the Supreme Court.  The CA modified his penalty by appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, AAA interposed the defense that he brought out the appliances in order to protect them creditors, who told him that the sheriff will take the appliances the next day.

Issues:

Whether or not AAA is guilty for violating Section 5(i) of RA 9262.

Whether or not the CA was correct in appreciating the mitigation circumstance of passion and obfuscation in AAA’s favor.

Ruling:

AAA is guilty of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262.

XXXX

The Court will address the final two elements as the first two are undoubtedly present in this case.

The cited section has been ruled to penalize certain forms of psychological violence.  As defined in law, psychological violence refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering to the victim.  Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental and emotional anguish is the effect caused upon or damage sustained by the offended party.  To establish this as an element, it is necessary to show proof commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i0.  To establish mental or emotional anguish, the testimony of the victim must be presented, as these experiences are personal to the party.

XXXX

The trial court observed that private complainant was “so hurt and humiliated.”  Augmenting the pain brought about by the situation was that petitioner “abandoned her and their children.”  The CA, for its part, remarked that petitioner admitted to pushing private complainant.  CCC also testified that the incident was not isolated, as similar arguments and even physical abuse had already happened between them.  Evidently, the above portions of private complainant’s testimony, as well as the other statements made by private complainant mentioned in the CA and RTC decisions, all prove petitioner had caused mental and emotional anguish upon private complainant.

Finally, private complainant’s anguish was clearly caused by acts of petitioner parallel to those provided by the law.  Private complainant’s suffering was due to petitioner’s denying the use of the appliances and furniture commonly owned by the family.  Anguish causes distress to someone, or makes someone suffer intense pain or sorrow.  It is doubtless that private complainant, by her own recount of the situation, was thoroughly distressed by petitioner’s acts, contrary to petitioner’s averments.

“XXXX. The Court highlights that he not only gathered the appliances that were used as collateral for the loan, i.e. the television set and refrigerator, but also took away the divided and even the “sleeprite” bed the family slept on.  His very act of depriving the entire family of such sleeping fixture does not justify his reasons.  Morevoer, his defense of lack of intent to commit the crime is contradicted by what transpired.  Private complainant tried to prevent petitioner from removing the appliances and furniture from their house, but petitioner did it against her will and even hurt her.  He could not deny causing her harm, mental and emotional anguish, and humiliation when he also “mauled” her in front of their children.

The CA erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion and obsfuscation, and in not imposing the penalty of fine and requiring the accused to undergo psychological counselling.

“The Court agrees with the RTC and the CA in finding the petitioner guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed by the CA, most especially the application of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. It must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and allows the reviewing tribunal to correct errors, though unassigned, in the appealed judgment. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision  of the penal law.  This principle  has been applied by the Court even in petitions for review on certiorari. 

A number of cases state that an offense is defined and is ostensibly punished under a special law, when the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature; necessarily, its duration, correlation, and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code also apply. Modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even to reduce the penalty by degrees.  However, in this case, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation should not mitigate the penalty imposed on petitioner.

In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements should occur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity.  This circumstance is considered mitigating because by reason of causes naturally producing powerful excitement in a person, he loses his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. 

The elements for the consideration of the mitigating circumstance are missing. Private complainant did not commit any unlawful act against petitioner that would cause such a reaction from him. Private complainant's acts also cannot be considered as providing a legitimate stimulus justifying petitioner's reaction – where he lost reason and self-control.

Further, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to include the imposition of a fine on petitioner and to require him to undergo psychological counseling or treatment. These are additional penalties that are set by Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 9262 in addition to imprisonment, thus:

SECTION 6. Penalties. – The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

x x x x

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor. 

x x x x

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court. (Underscoring supplied)”

(G.R. No. 229762, November 28, 2018, AAA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.)

Barangay Protection Orders Under RA 9262.

What is a protection order under Republic Act 9262?

The law defines a protection order as an order issued under RA 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of the law and granting other reliefs.  The relief under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life.

There are three kinds of protection orders, the Barangay Protection Order, the Temporary Protection Order, and the Permanent Protection Order.  The temporary and protection orders are issued by the courts upon compliance with substantial and procedural requirements, while a Barangay protection order is issued by the Barangay having jurisdiction over the victim’s residence.

This post limits itself to protection orders issued by the Barangay (BPO)

The law specifically empowers the barangays to prevent acts of violence against women and their children by giving them the power to issue barangay protection orders, enforcing them, and penalizing the respondent for violation of the provisions of the barangay protection order.  It specifically enjoins the Barangay to act with despatch in preventing violence against women through physical harm, the recurrence thereof, and the threat of imminent physical harm to the woman or her child or children.

Does the grant of issuance of barangay protection order constitute an undue delegation of judicial power to the Barangay?

In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay of the law, in violation of the Constitution, thus:

“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.  On the other hand, executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.  It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.

As clearly delimited by the afore-quoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, any any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.  Such function of the Punong Barangay, is thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay”.

We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an office is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding “whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,“ the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman or her child exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO.  The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial function.  The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO”. (G.R. NO. 179267, JUNE 25, 2013, Garcia vs Drilon, et al.)

A Barangay Protection Order is a protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of RA 9262.  Thus, the perpetrator is ordered to desist from causing physical harm to the woman or her and/or threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.  A Barangay protection order is more limited in scope than that granted by the courts, presupposing that it is  recurring or imminent physical harm towards the victim that should be averted.  The application and/or grant of a Barangay protection order does not preclude the filing of a temporary or a permanent protection order with the court.

Procedure

Applications for Barangay protection orders should comply with the rules on venue under Section 409 of the Local Government Code of 1991, thus; (a) disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay while those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complaint.

Applications for and hearing for the grant of protection order shall have precedence over all other business of the barangay.

A Punong Barangay who receives an application for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing of after ex party determination of the basis of the application.  If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad.  If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO.

A Barangay Protection Order is effective for fifteen (15) days.  The ex party BPO shall, upon issuance, be immediately and personally served upon the respondent by the Punong Barangay, the Barangay Kagawad, or he may direct any barangay officer to effect its personal service to the respondent.  In any proceeding before the barangay, the parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate.

A Barangay protection order shall contain in printed form in capital letters the notice: 

“VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.”

A violation of the barangay protection order must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court or municipal trial having territiorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the protection order.  Violation of BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.  A respondent who wish to appeal on a judgment for violation of BPO may appeal according to the Rules of Court.  The trial court hearing the case for violation of a BPO may issue a protection order moot proprio as it deems necessary without need of an application.

In conclusion, a barangay protection order is the most immediate relief that a woman victim of violence can resort to, but for a more effective and comprehensive protection against violence, the petitioner should resort to the court for relief.  After all, the court has broader power to grant relief under the law.  

Being romantically involved does not require that the parties have a sexual relationship

One single act of sending a lewd photograph using a multimedia message thru a cellphone is enough to constitute the crime of violence against women thru harassment, even if the parties’ relationship is “on-and-off” and there was no sexual relations involved.  This is the first conviction for violation of Republic Act 9262.

The Case:

AAA and BBB were sweethearts for a time before BBB impregnated a woman that subsequently became his wife, thus AAA broke up with BBB. Before he got married, BBB tried to convince to elope, but AAA refused.  AAA changed her phone number, but BBB managed to find out her cell phone number, and used two numbers to send her text messages.  One morning in June, 2005, AAA received from one of the cellphone numbers used by BBB, the picture of a naked woman with AAA’s face superimposed on the photograph, making it appear that AAA was naked.  Aside from the picture of the naked woman with her face on it, AAA also received messages threatening her that the picture will be spread out in chatrooms.  Seeking police assistance, AAA asked BBB to meet her in a resort, where BBB was arrested.  Seized from him was the cellphone containing the sim card was seized from him.  

A case for violation of RA 9262 was filed against BBB.  After trial, he was convicted for violation of Section 5(h) of RA 9262, violence against women thru harassment.

In his appeal, he argues that he should not be convicted of the crime, as the single instance of harassment would unduly ruin him.  Further, he argues that there was no dating relationship between him and AAA, as defined by the law, as their relationship was an “on and off”, or “away-bati” relationship. Further, BBB argues that the assuming the message sent was obscene, it is not so injurious given today’s modern women are so used to it.

Issue:

Whether or not BBB is guilty of violation of RA 9262 as charged.

Ruling:

BBB is guilty of the crime charged

Elements of the crime of violence against women thru harassment:

“Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x x x

h. Engaging in purposefol, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.  This  shall include but, but not be limited to, the following acts:

x x x x x

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an acts or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarm or cause substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Being romantically involved does not require that the parties have a sexual relationship

The parties to this case agree that the prosecution need to prove that accused Rustan had a “dating relationship” with Irish.  Section 3(e) provides that a “dating relationship” includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) “Dating relationship” refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)

But it seems clear that the the law did not use inits provisions the colloquial verb “romance” that implies a sexual act.  It did not say that the offender must have “romanced” the offended woman. Rather, it used the nouns “romance” to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e. “a love affair.”

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that “violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.”  Clearly, the itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.  Indeed, Section 3(e) above  defines “dating relationship” while Section 3(f) defines “sexual relations”.  The latter refers to a “single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.”.  The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist without a sexual intercouse taking place between those involved.

An on and off relationship should not be construed that the parties have no dating relationship.

"An “away-bati” or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence.  Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.”

A single act of harassment constitute a violation of the law.

“XXX. But Section 3(a) of RA 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitute violence against women.  This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough.  The object of the law is to protect women and children.  Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course be only determined based on the circumstance of each case.

“The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth.  What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case.”

(G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010, Rustan Ang vs. CA and AAA (name of complainant withheld in accordance with SEc. 47 RA 9262)

The act of denying support to a child penalized under RA 9262 is a continuing crime.

May foreigners be held liable for violation of RA 9262? This is the question raised in  this case decided by the Supreme Court.  This case tackled the issue of whether or not aliens who sired a child with a Filipino spouse may be held liable for support. 

The Facts:

ßAAA and BBB were married in Holland in 1190.  They had a son, CCC, born in 1994.  Their marriage, however, did not last, and in 1995, they entered into a Divorce Covenant.  AAA, the wife, and her son went back to the Philippines.  BBB later went to the Philippines, contracted another marriage, and established a catering business in the Province of Cebu.  Both AAA and BBB were residents of Cebu. Alleging that BBB did not provide financial support for their son, AAA sent a demand letter for support to BBB.  BBB refused to receive the letter, hence AAA filed a complaint for violation of RA 9262 against BBB.  Preliminary investigation ensued, and the provincial prosecutor later on filed a case for violation of Section 5 (E)(2) against BBB. BBB posted bail, and was arraigned.  Before the RTC, he filed his motion to dismiss the case, averring that since he is an alien, he is not bound to support the child under RA 9262.  

The RTC sided with BBB, and dismissed the case. 

On pure question of law, AAA appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether or not BBB, a foreign national, is liable for violation of RA 9262.

Ruling:

On whether or not BBB is bound by Art. 195 of the Family Code on the obligation of parents to support the child, the Supreme Court held that BBB is not liable since the Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality.

“Insofar as family laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same applies only to Filipino citizens.  By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.  Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, to to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.”

While the Court said that respondent is not obliged to give support to his child under Art. 195 of the Family Code, it also said that respondent is not altogether bound to give support to his child.  While he pleaded Dutch law in his defense, he was not able to prove his national law, which must be proven as fact in this jurisdiction as they do not prove themselves in the Philippines and the courts are not allowed to take judicial notice of them.  Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.  For failure on the part of the respondent to allege and prove the national law of Netherlands on support, the Court applied the doctrine of processual presumption in resolving that respondent is liable to support his child, thus:

“In view of the respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.  Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that foreign law is the same as our local law or domestic or internal law.  Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalising the non-compliance therewith”

Another thing that militated against the accused is the doctrine, applied in the ruling of Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, that when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied:

“Additionally prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle embedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure is pertinent.

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.  Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.  To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principle of Conflict of laws.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support the child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice the the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

In the end, the Court applied the territoriality principle in criminal law, in finding the respondent may be held liable for violation of RA 9262 for failure to support his minor child:

“In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: [p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations.”  On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City.  As such our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent.  It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.”

No prescription of the offense charged:

“Finally, we do not agree with the respondent’s argument that granting, without admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of RA 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crimes under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period - Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5 (f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.  Acts falling under Section 5 (g) to 5 (i) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Secton  5(e) (2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.  Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.”

Case was remanded to the RTC for trial on the merits.

(G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM vs. ENRST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM)

Even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R. A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts

May a Philippine court acquire jurisdiction in a case for psychological violence under Article 9262 when the act causing mental or emotional anguish was committed abroad?  In this case, the act causing the mental and emotional anguish which is an element of the crime in a prosecution for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act 9262, was the alleged extra-marital affair conducted by the husband working abroad with a Singaporean woman.  

This is the question of law raised in a Rule 45 petition by AAA. 

AAA filed a case for violation of RA 9262 against BBB.  Among the allegations in her complaint before the Prosecutor’s Office was that BBB, whom she married in 2006, had an illicit affair in Singapore when the latter went there to work as a chef sometime in 2007.  Eventually, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed a case for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 against BBB, for causing emotional and mental anguish on AAA by having an illicit relationship with a woman in Singapore.  Subsequently, an information was filed against BBB.

In 2013, BBB filed an Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest before the RTC.  He argued that he cannot be charged with the crime as the alleged marital infidelity was committed in Singapore, thus the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

The RTC sided with BBB and quashed the Information.  The court reasoned out that it had no jurisdiction over the offense as the act itself which had caused mental and emotional anguish must have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.  As the act which allegedly caused the mental and emotional anguish was committed in Singapore, the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

AAA disagrees, and argue that the strict interpretation of the law by the RTC poses a danger that the law may become a useless piece of legislation because with its ruling, Filipino husbands may commit illicit relationship without fear of any consequence as long as they were committed abroad.  She argues further that the court may exercise jurisdiction over the offense charged as long any of the essential elements of the crime are present.  In this case, she posits that the mental and emotional anguish she experience is an essential element of the crime which she experience s wherever she goes, citing Section 7 of the law itself which provides for the jurisdiction of the RTC, in relation to Art. 4 of the law, mandating the liberal interpretation of the law in promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.

The Court’s ruling:

RA 9262 criminalizes the mental and emotional anguish caused by marital infidelity, not the marital infidelity itself:

“Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalises is not the marital infidelity per se, but the psychological violence causing mental and emotional suffering on the wife.  Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.  Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed.  Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not be even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife.  Thus the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.”

Section 7 of RA 9262 contemplates that venue pertains to jurisdiction:

"In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction,  As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed there the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.  Which the psychological as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an essential element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.  The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estate, viz:

x x x x

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another.  In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognisance of the same excludes the other.  Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph © was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense.   In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act of causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB’s marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction.  It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband.  What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is committed abroad.  We say that even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R. A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.”

(AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018)