The Facts:
While conducting a beat patrol, POI Peniano and his companions chanced upon a person urinating against the wall. They accosted him and invited him to the police station. While being handcuffed, the accused, Ramon Picardal attempted to run away, but POI Penano managed to subdue him. When frisked, Ramon yielded in his possession one Caliber .38 revolver containing five live bullets. He was arrested and subsequently charged with violation of MMDANo. 96-009, which prohibits urinating in public, among others, and illegal possession of firearms before the RTC.
Both the RTC and the CA found the accused guilty as charged, ruling that all the elements of the crime had been proven. Meanwhile, the MTC dismissed the charge for violation of MMDA regulation. Ramon appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramon is guilty of illegal possession of firearms;
Whether or not there was a valid search
Ruling:
The Petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the factual findings of the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are generally final and conclusive on the Court. The foregoing rule, however, is subject to the following exceptions:
1. the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
2. the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
7. the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;
8. the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
9. the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
10. the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
11. such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the ninth exception applies. The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed facts that: (1) the firearm subject of this case was seized from Picardal after he was frisked by the police officers for allegedly urinating in a public place; and (2) the aforementioned case for "urinating in a public place" filed against Picardal was subsequently dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The act supposedly committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place — is punished only by Section 2(a) of Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Regulation No. 96-009 (MMDA Regulation), which provides that:
Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts
a) It is unlawful to dump, throw or litter, garbage, refuse, or any form of solid waste in public places and immediate surroundings, including vacant lots, rivers, canals, drainage and other water ways as defined in Section 1 of this Regulation and to urinate, defecate and spit in public places. (Emphasis supplied)
The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for a violation of the said section is only a fine of five hundred pesos (PhP500.00) or community service of one (1) day. The said regulation did not provide that the violator may be imprisoned for violating the same, precisely because it is merely a regulation issued by the MMDA.
Stated differently, the MMDA Regulation is, as its name implies, a mere regulation, and not a law or an ordinance.
Therefore, even if it were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public place, the police officers involved in this case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no or there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.
In Luz v. People, a man who was driving a motorcycle was flagged down for violating a municipal ordinance requiring drivers of motorcycles to wear a helmet. While the police officer was issuing him a ticket, the officer noticed that the man was uneasy and kept touching something in his jacket. When the officer ordered the man to take the thing out of his jacket, it was discovered that it was a small tin can which contained sachets of shabu. When the man was prosecuted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the Court acquitted the accused as the confiscated drugs were discovered through an unlawful search. Hence:
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter[.]
x x x x
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The same principle applies in the present case. There was similarly no lawful arrest in this case as Picardal's violation, if at all committed, was only punishable by fine.
In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v. People, reminds:
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be used in any prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As there is no longer any evidence against Picardal in this case, he must perforce be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31, 2017 and Resolution dated October 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38123 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Ramon Picardal y Baluyot is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.
G.R No. 235749, June 19, 2019, RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Citations omitted.
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