Just because your relationship with a woman had ended does not mean you cannot be anymore be charged with violation of Republic Act 9262. While Section 3 of RA 9262 defines violence against women and children and delineates who may be held liable, the same applies also to offenders who commit acts of violence against women and children even if the the sexual or dating relationship had ended
This is the case of AAA, respondent-woman, and BBB, petitioner-man. Their relationship ended prior to the subject incident. Sometime in July, 2009, AA met BBB and sought payment of the money the latter owed her. BBB could not pay. When he asked her if she was the one responsible for spreading rumours about him, she admitted it. BBB slapped her, thus AA filed a case against BBB for violation of Section 5 (a). The case eventually reached the RTC, where BBB filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Since the RTC denied his plea, BBB went up to the Supreme Court on our question of law, on whether or not BBB should be held liable for violation of RA 9262, since the physical injuries inflicted was committed after the relationship between the parties have ended.
Ruling against the petitioner, the Court held:
There are two limiting qualifications for an act or a series of acts to be considered as violence against women and children:
“The law is broad in specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women and children through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child, or against her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
It is not indispensable that the act of violence be committed be a consequence of such relationship.
“Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and th victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot act depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner’s assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.”
The law should be construed in accordance with legislative intent to impose severe sanction on offenders who commit acts of violence against women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship.
“Neither can the Court construe the statue in favor of the petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.”
(G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013, BBB vs. RTC Branch 59, Angeles City; the Office of the City Prosecutor, and ABC)
Ruling against the petitioner, the Court held:
There are two limiting qualifications for an act or a series of acts to be considered as violence against women and children:
“The law is broad in specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women and children through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child, or against her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
It is not indispensable that the act of violence be committed be a consequence of such relationship.
“Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and th victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot act depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner’s assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.”
The law should be construed in accordance with legislative intent to impose severe sanction on offenders who commit acts of violence against women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship.
“Neither can the Court construe the statue in favor of the petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.”
(G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013, BBB vs. RTC Branch 59, Angeles City; the Office of the City Prosecutor, and ABC)
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