The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.

The Facts:

While conducting a beat patrol, POI Peniano and his companions chanced upon a person urinating against the wall.  They accosted him and invited him to the police station.  While being handcuffed, the accused, Ramon Picardal attempted to run away, but POI Penano managed to subdue him.  When frisked, Ramon yielded in his possession one Caliber .38 revolver containing five live bullets.  He was arrested and subsequently charged with violation of MMDANo. 96-009, which prohibits urinating in public, among others, and illegal possession of firearms before the RTC.  

Both the RTC and the CA found the accused guilty as charged, ruling that all the elements of the crime had been proven.  Meanwhile, the MTC dismissed the charge for violation of MMDA regulation.  Ramon appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Ramon is guilty of illegal possession of firearms;

Whether or not there was a valid search

Ruling:

The Petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the factual findings of the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are generally final and conclusive on the Court. The foregoing rule, however, is subject to the following exceptions:

1. the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

2. the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. there is grave abuse of discretion;

4. the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;

7. the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;

8. the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;

9. the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;

10. the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and

11. such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.  (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the ninth exception applies. The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed facts that: (1) the firearm subject of this case was seized from Picardal after he was frisked by the police officers for allegedly urinating in a public place; and (2) the aforementioned case for "urinating in a public place" filed against Picardal was subsequently dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The act supposedly committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place — is punished only by Section 2(a) of Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Regulation No. 96-009  (MMDA Regulation), which provides that:

Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts

a) It is unlawful to dump, throw or litter, garbage, refuse, or any form of solid waste in public places and immediate surroundings, including vacant lots, rivers, canals, drainage and other water ways as defined in Section 1 of this Regulation and to urinate, defecate and spit in public places. (Emphasis supplied)

The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for a violation of the said section is only a fine of five hundred pesos (PhP500.00) or community service of one (1) day. The said regulation did not provide that the violator may be imprisoned for violating the same, precisely because it is merely a regulation issued by the MMDA. 

Stated differently, the MMDA Regulation is, as its name implies, a mere regulation, and not a law or an ordinance.

Therefore, even if it were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public place, the police officers involved in this case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no or there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.

In Luz v. People,  a man who was driving a motorcycle was flagged down for violating a municipal ordinance requiring drivers of motorcycles to wear a helmet. While the police officer was issuing him a ticket, the officer noticed that the man was uneasy and kept touching something in his jacket. When the officer ordered the man to take the thing out of his jacket, it was discovered that it was a small tin can which contained sachets of shabu. When the man was prosecuted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the Court acquitted the accused as the confiscated drugs were discovered through an unlawful search. Hence:

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter[.]

x x x x

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same principle applies in the present case. There was similarly no lawful arrest in this case as Picardal's violation, if at all committed, was only punishable by fine.

In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v. People,  reminds:

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be used in any prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As there is no longer any evidence against Picardal in this case, he must perforce be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31, 2017 and Resolution dated October 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38123 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Ramon Picardal y Baluyot is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

G.R No. 235749, June 19, 2019,  RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Citations omitted.

A Rule 108 petition is not proper when a party's filiation will be gravely affected...

The Facts:

Glenn is one of the legitimate children of John (deceased) and Beatriz.  Joan, on the other hand, claims to be an illegitimate daughter of John, and after John’s death, filed a petition for partition and accounting of John’s estate.  Glenn, on the other hand, filed a petition for cancellation of Joan’s certificate of live birth under Rule 108, praying also that Joan’s surname be changed from Miller to Espineda in all her official documents.  Glenn alleged that as his father John did not affix his signature on Joan’s birth certificate, he did not acknowledge Joan as his illegitimate child.  In her defense, Joan insisted that John continously and openly recognized her as his daughter, by supporting her education, and mentioned her in his letter to Lonie.  He also gave Joan 1/8 of his estate in his holographic will.

After trial, the RTC dismissed Glenn’s petition, which the CA affirmed, thus Glenn filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

The Issue:

Whether or not a Rule 108 petition is proper to compel Joan to change her surname from Miller to Espenida.

The Ruling:

This Court stresses that Glenn's initiatory pleading before the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City is a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida.

This type of petition is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

RULE 108

Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SECTION 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; G) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SECTION 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SECTION 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SECTION 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SECTION 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SECTION 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

In In re: Barretto v. The Local Registrar of Manila, this Court explained that:

. . . the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to "innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" or corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.^[60]

Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her birth certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use her mother's surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an acknowledged illegitimate child of John.

What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.

Petition dismissed.

G.R. 200344, August 28, 2019, GLENN M. MILLER, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING LEGAL HEIRS, NAMELY: [1] EVELYN L. MILLER; [2] JENNIFER ANN L. MILLER; [3] LESLIE ANN L. MILLER; [4] RACHEL ANN L. MILLER; AND [5] VALERIE ANN L. MILLER, PETITIONERS, VS. JOAN MILLER Y ESPENIDA A.K.A. JOHNLYN MILLER Y ESPENIDA AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GUBAT, SORSOGON,RESPONDENTS.

RA 9262: Denying the use of the appliances and furniture commonly owned by the family can be a ground for mental and emotional distress.

Even the simple act of of a husband’s moving out of the household the appliances and furniture that are part of the conjugal house, and transferring it to his parent’s house, when the same is against the will of the wife and causes her distress, can lead to a conviction for RA 9262.

This is one case where the Supreme Court went beyond the allegations of the Information in the case and proceeded to determine the guilt of the accused based on the testimony of the victim that she was a victim of psychological violence by her husband by appreciating previous incidents of abuse that in totality caused the victim mental and emotional anguish. Personally, I believe that this case should be a lesson for lawyers to be mindful of the testimony of adverse witness at the witness stand, so as to exclude irrelevant and immaterial matters from being included in the direct testimony by way of timely objection to the questions propounded or the answers given thereto, otherwise, those other matters not alleged in the Information should not have found its way into the records of the case.   Of course, the SC made much of the fact that the relevant portion of the information was indeed proven beyond reasonable doubt, but it cannot be denied that the Court also appreciated other acts of the accused not included in the Information but forming part of the victim’s testimony to establish mental and emotional anguish on the part of the victim, leading to the accused’s conviction.

The Information in the case reads:

That on or about February 17, 2010 in the City of [XXX], Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of violence against his wife [BBB], as follows: by taking their conjugal properties and bring[ing] them to the house of his mother without regard to her feelings and against her will which caused mental, emotional anguish to his legal wife [BBB].

Contrary to and in violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against women and their Children Act of 2004.

The Facts:

AAA, husband and BBB, had been married for 19 years when on February 17, 2010, they had an altercation.  AAA learned that AAA had incurred debts and some of the appliances which he bought with his hard-earned money were used as collateral by AAA.  As a result, AAA took out some of the appliances and brought it to his parents’ house nearby, depriving AAA of the use and enjoyment of the appliances.  The incident was witnessed by their child, CCC.  As a result of the incident, BBB filed a case for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262.  After trial, the court convicted AAA as charged, hence BBB appealed his case all the way to the Supreme Court.  The CA modified his penalty by appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, AAA interposed the defense that he brought out the appliances in order to protect them creditors, who told him that the sheriff will take the appliances the next day.

Issues:

Whether or not AAA is guilty for violating Section 5(i) of RA 9262.

Whether or not the CA was correct in appreciating the mitigation circumstance of passion and obfuscation in AAA’s favor.

Ruling:

AAA is guilty of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262.

XXXX

The Court will address the final two elements as the first two are undoubtedly present in this case.

The cited section has been ruled to penalize certain forms of psychological violence.  As defined in law, psychological violence refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering to the victim.  Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental and emotional anguish is the effect caused upon or damage sustained by the offended party.  To establish this as an element, it is necessary to show proof commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i0.  To establish mental or emotional anguish, the testimony of the victim must be presented, as these experiences are personal to the party.

XXXX

The trial court observed that private complainant was “so hurt and humiliated.”  Augmenting the pain brought about by the situation was that petitioner “abandoned her and their children.”  The CA, for its part, remarked that petitioner admitted to pushing private complainant.  CCC also testified that the incident was not isolated, as similar arguments and even physical abuse had already happened between them.  Evidently, the above portions of private complainant’s testimony, as well as the other statements made by private complainant mentioned in the CA and RTC decisions, all prove petitioner had caused mental and emotional anguish upon private complainant.

Finally, private complainant’s anguish was clearly caused by acts of petitioner parallel to those provided by the law.  Private complainant’s suffering was due to petitioner’s denying the use of the appliances and furniture commonly owned by the family.  Anguish causes distress to someone, or makes someone suffer intense pain or sorrow.  It is doubtless that private complainant, by her own recount of the situation, was thoroughly distressed by petitioner’s acts, contrary to petitioner’s averments.

“XXXX. The Court highlights that he not only gathered the appliances that were used as collateral for the loan, i.e. the television set and refrigerator, but also took away the divided and even the “sleeprite” bed the family slept on.  His very act of depriving the entire family of such sleeping fixture does not justify his reasons.  Morevoer, his defense of lack of intent to commit the crime is contradicted by what transpired.  Private complainant tried to prevent petitioner from removing the appliances and furniture from their house, but petitioner did it against her will and even hurt her.  He could not deny causing her harm, mental and emotional anguish, and humiliation when he also “mauled” her in front of their children.

The CA erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion and obsfuscation, and in not imposing the penalty of fine and requiring the accused to undergo psychological counselling.

“The Court agrees with the RTC and the CA in finding the petitioner guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed by the CA, most especially the application of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. It must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and allows the reviewing tribunal to correct errors, though unassigned, in the appealed judgment. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision  of the penal law.  This principle  has been applied by the Court even in petitions for review on certiorari. 

A number of cases state that an offense is defined and is ostensibly punished under a special law, when the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature; necessarily, its duration, correlation, and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code also apply. Modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even to reduce the penalty by degrees.  However, in this case, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation should not mitigate the penalty imposed on petitioner.

In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements should occur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity.  This circumstance is considered mitigating because by reason of causes naturally producing powerful excitement in a person, he loses his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. 

The elements for the consideration of the mitigating circumstance are missing. Private complainant did not commit any unlawful act against petitioner that would cause such a reaction from him. Private complainant's acts also cannot be considered as providing a legitimate stimulus justifying petitioner's reaction – where he lost reason and self-control.

Further, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to include the imposition of a fine on petitioner and to require him to undergo psychological counseling or treatment. These are additional penalties that are set by Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 9262 in addition to imprisonment, thus:

SECTION 6. Penalties. – The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

x x x x

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor. 

x x x x

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court. (Underscoring supplied)”

(G.R. No. 229762, November 28, 2018, AAA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.)

Barangay Protection Orders Under RA 9262.

What is a protection order under Republic Act 9262?

The law defines a protection order as an order issued under RA 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of the law and granting other reliefs.  The relief under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life.

There are three kinds of protection orders, the Barangay Protection Order, the Temporary Protection Order, and the Permanent Protection Order.  The temporary and protection orders are issued by the courts upon compliance with substantial and procedural requirements, while a Barangay protection order is issued by the Barangay having jurisdiction over the victim’s residence.

This post limits itself to protection orders issued by the Barangay (BPO)

The law specifically empowers the barangays to prevent acts of violence against women and their children by giving them the power to issue barangay protection orders, enforcing them, and penalizing the respondent for violation of the provisions of the barangay protection order.  It specifically enjoins the Barangay to act with despatch in preventing violence against women through physical harm, the recurrence thereof, and the threat of imminent physical harm to the woman or her child or children.

Does the grant of issuance of barangay protection order constitute an undue delegation of judicial power to the Barangay?

In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay of the law, in violation of the Constitution, thus:

“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.  On the other hand, executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.  It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.

As clearly delimited by the afore-quoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, any any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.  Such function of the Punong Barangay, is thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay”.

We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an office is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding “whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,“ the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman or her child exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO.  The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial function.  The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO”. (G.R. NO. 179267, JUNE 25, 2013, Garcia vs Drilon, et al.)

A Barangay Protection Order is a protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of RA 9262.  Thus, the perpetrator is ordered to desist from causing physical harm to the woman or her and/or threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.  A Barangay protection order is more limited in scope than that granted by the courts, presupposing that it is  recurring or imminent physical harm towards the victim that should be averted.  The application and/or grant of a Barangay protection order does not preclude the filing of a temporary or a permanent protection order with the court.

Procedure

Applications for Barangay protection orders should comply with the rules on venue under Section 409 of the Local Government Code of 1991, thus; (a) disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay while those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complaint.

Applications for and hearing for the grant of protection order shall have precedence over all other business of the barangay.

A Punong Barangay who receives an application for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing of after ex party determination of the basis of the application.  If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad.  If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO.

A Barangay Protection Order is effective for fifteen (15) days.  The ex party BPO shall, upon issuance, be immediately and personally served upon the respondent by the Punong Barangay, the Barangay Kagawad, or he may direct any barangay officer to effect its personal service to the respondent.  In any proceeding before the barangay, the parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate.

A Barangay protection order shall contain in printed form in capital letters the notice: 

“VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.”

A violation of the barangay protection order must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court or municipal trial having territiorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the protection order.  Violation of BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.  A respondent who wish to appeal on a judgment for violation of BPO may appeal according to the Rules of Court.  The trial court hearing the case for violation of a BPO may issue a protection order moot proprio as it deems necessary without need of an application.

In conclusion, a barangay protection order is the most immediate relief that a woman victim of violence can resort to, but for a more effective and comprehensive protection against violence, the petitioner should resort to the court for relief.  After all, the court has broader power to grant relief under the law.  

Being romantically involved does not require that the parties have a sexual relationship

One single act of sending a lewd photograph using a multimedia message thru a cellphone is enough to constitute the crime of violence against women thru harassment, even if the parties’ relationship is “on-and-off” and there was no sexual relations involved.  This is the first conviction for violation of Republic Act 9262.

The Case:

AAA and BBB were sweethearts for a time before BBB impregnated a woman that subsequently became his wife, thus AAA broke up with BBB. Before he got married, BBB tried to convince to elope, but AAA refused.  AAA changed her phone number, but BBB managed to find out her cell phone number, and used two numbers to send her text messages.  One morning in June, 2005, AAA received from one of the cellphone numbers used by BBB, the picture of a naked woman with AAA’s face superimposed on the photograph, making it appear that AAA was naked.  Aside from the picture of the naked woman with her face on it, AAA also received messages threatening her that the picture will be spread out in chatrooms.  Seeking police assistance, AAA asked BBB to meet her in a resort, where BBB was arrested.  Seized from him was the cellphone containing the sim card was seized from him.  

A case for violation of RA 9262 was filed against BBB.  After trial, he was convicted for violation of Section 5(h) of RA 9262, violence against women thru harassment.

In his appeal, he argues that he should not be convicted of the crime, as the single instance of harassment would unduly ruin him.  Further, he argues that there was no dating relationship between him and AAA, as defined by the law, as their relationship was an “on and off”, or “away-bati” relationship. Further, BBB argues that the assuming the message sent was obscene, it is not so injurious given today’s modern women are so used to it.

Issue:

Whether or not BBB is guilty of violation of RA 9262 as charged.

Ruling:

BBB is guilty of the crime charged

Elements of the crime of violence against women thru harassment:

“Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x x x

h. Engaging in purposefol, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.  This  shall include but, but not be limited to, the following acts:

x x x x x

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an acts or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarm or cause substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Being romantically involved does not require that the parties have a sexual relationship

The parties to this case agree that the prosecution need to prove that accused Rustan had a “dating relationship” with Irish.  Section 3(e) provides that a “dating relationship” includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) “Dating relationship” refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)

But it seems clear that the the law did not use inits provisions the colloquial verb “romance” that implies a sexual act.  It did not say that the offender must have “romanced” the offended woman. Rather, it used the nouns “romance” to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e. “a love affair.”

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that “violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.”  Clearly, the itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.  Indeed, Section 3(e) above  defines “dating relationship” while Section 3(f) defines “sexual relations”.  The latter refers to a “single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.”.  The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist without a sexual intercouse taking place between those involved.

An on and off relationship should not be construed that the parties have no dating relationship.

"An “away-bati” or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence.  Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.”

A single act of harassment constitute a violation of the law.

“XXX. But Section 3(a) of RA 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitute violence against women.  This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough.  The object of the law is to protect women and children.  Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course be only determined based on the circumstance of each case.

“The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth.  What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case.”

(G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010, Rustan Ang vs. CA and AAA (name of complainant withheld in accordance with SEc. 47 RA 9262)